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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JODY ROTHE, 
Category: 14b 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DALE KURT ROTHE, Case No. 880018-CA 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2)(g). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order on the Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce entered into the records of the Court on 
the 17th day of December, 1987. The only issue raised by this 
appeal is the determination by the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani, and the subsequent Order of the 
Honorable George E. Ballif as it relates to any mortgage 
obligations on the home received by the Plaintiff. The Defendant 
Dale Rothe did not contest the divorce based upon the Stipulation 
of the parties. 
In August of 1986, Defendant Dale Rothe filed a Petition for 
modification of the Divorce Decree. In pertinent part, the 
Defendant sought an Order of the Court requiring the Plaintiff, 
Jody Rothe, to bear the obligation of a note which Defendant 
entered into with his parents for a loan. The money received 
from the loan was used to purchase a home which Defendant 
purchased before the parties' marriage. 
At the time the house was acquired, the Defendant assumed an 
existing VA mortgage already on the home and paid the balance 
with the money received from his parents. Pursuant to the terms 
of the Decree of Divorce, "the Plaintiff is to assume and be 
responsible for the mortgage due and owing on the home of the 
parties." (R. 16) 
The matter was first heard before the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani, who determined that Defendant, 
Dale Rothe, did not have standing to assert any rights that his 
parents might otherwise have to the property. An objection was 
made by the Defendant to the Recommendation. Consequently, the 
matter was then heard before the Honorable George E. Ballif of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court who determined that the 
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agreement between Defendant Dale Rothe and his parents did not 
constitute a mortgage on the home and that based upon the 
evidence and documents, Plaintiff Jody Rothe was not obligated to 
assume the debt between Dale Rothe and his parents • It is from 
the holding of Judge Ballif which Defendant Dale Rothe now 
appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Does Defendant, Dale Rothe, have standing to seek the 
Court's Order requiring the Plaintiff to pay a debt to his 
parents arising out of a loan to the Defendant, Dale Rothe, from 
his parents which was used to pay for a home prior to the 
parties' marriage when Defendant has quit claimed any and all 
interest in the subject property to the Plaintiff and 
Defendant's parents have not asserted any claim for repayment 
against Defendant Dale Rothe? 
II. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
agreement between Defendant and his parents failed to constitute 
a mortgage and, therefore, Plaintiff is not responsible for the 
debt? 
III. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
withholding of the $150.00 payment by the Defendant, Dale Rothe, 
from the support payments which was subsequently paid to his 
parents did not rise to the level of partial performance 
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sufficient to establish an equitable mortgage? 
IV, Is it proper for the Court to allow parol evidence as 
to the intent and understanding of the parties in light of the 
clear and unambiguous language of the Decree of Divorce? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-1-14: 
(here insert name), mortgagor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby 
mortgages to (insert name), mortgagee, of 
(insert place of residence), for the 
sum of $ the following described tract 
of land in county, Utah, to-wit: 
(here describe the premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following 
indebtedness. (Here state amount and form of 
indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to 
whom payable and where). 
The mortgager agrees to pay all taxes and assessments 
on said premises, in the sum of $ 
attorney's fees in the case of foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this day of 
, 19 . Such mortgage as executed by law 
shall have the effect of a conveyance of the land 
therein described, together with all of the rights, 
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to 
the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal 
representatives as security for the payment of 
indebtedness thereon set forth, with covenants from 
the mortgagor of general warranty of title, and that 
all taxes and assessments levied and assessed upon the 
land described, during the continuance of the 
mortgage, will be paid previous to the date appointed 
for the sale of such lands for taxes; and maybe 
foreclosure as provided by law upon any default being 
made in any of the conditions thereof as to the 
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payment of either principal, interest, taxes or 
assessments. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal from the Recommendation of the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner and the subsequent Order of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in which the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani, and the Honorable George E. 
Ballif have denied Defendant Dale Rothefs Petition for 
Modification seeking an Order of the Court requiring the 
Plaintiff to assume the obligation of an agreement entered into 
between Defendant and Defendant's parents prior to the marriage 
of the parties in which Defendant's parents loaned money to 
Defendant for the purchase of the subject home. 
Although other issues were addressed and resolved by the 
Court pursuant to Defendant's Petition for Modification as well 
as Plaintiff's Counter-petition, the only issue relevant to this 
appeal is that portion of the Petition which relates to any 
mortgage payments on the parties' home and whether the agreement 
between Defendant and Defendant's parents constitutes a mortgage 
for which Plaintiff should be required to assume. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The original Complaint for divorce was filed by the 
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Plaintiff, Jody Rothe, on July 17, 1980. (R. 1) The Complaint 
was accompanied by an Appearance, Consent and Waiver signed by 
the Defendant, Dale Rothe, in which Defendant acknowledged that 
he understood the Complaint and that he agreed to the contents 
thereof. (R. 5) 
On October 24, 1980, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. (R. 11-17) The 
Decree of Divorce provided in pertinent part: 
The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible for the 
mortgage due and owing upon the home of the parties. . 
. (R. 16) 
At the time the house was purchased some 9 or 10 months 
before the parties' marriage, the Defendant assumed an existing 
VA mortgage and borrowed the balance from his parents. (R. 224) 
The Defendant, Dale Rothe, filed a Petition to modify the 
Decree of Divorce on or about August 21, 1986, alleging that the 
agreement he entered into between himself and his parents prior 
to the marriage was a debt for which Plaintiff was responsible. 
The issue was first presented to the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani, by way of proffer and proposed 
Findings of Fact who subsequently entered his Recommendation on 
the 15th day of June, 1987, (R. 157) refusing to order Plaintiff 
to pay any monies to Defendant's parents and further ruled that 
Defendant's parents had the obligation of enforcing any rights 
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against a person who a Court of competent jurisdiction may 
determine to be responsible. (R. 107). 
On June 24, 1987, Defendant filed an Objection to the 
Recommendation entered by the Domestic Relations Commissioner, 
Howard H. Maetani. (R. 159) 
A hearing was held in the Fourth Judicial District Court for 
Utah County, State of Utah, before the Honorable George E. Ballif 
on the 16th day of December, 1987, in which the parties 
presented evidence on Defendant's Objection to the 
Recommendation. (R. 209) 
C. DISPOSITION OF COURT BELOW. 
Pursuant to the order of the court (R. 95) the parties 
submitted their proposed Proffers and Findings of Fact to the 
Court arguing their respective positions. (R. 97-155) 
Subsequently, on the 15th day of June, 1987, Howard H. Maetani, 
Domestic Relations Commissioner, entered his Recommendation in 
which he stated: 
The Court makes no order as it relates to the monies 
owing to Defendants parents. If any monies are in 
fact due and owing, the Defendant's parents have the 
obligation of enforcing any such right againsj persons 
who a court of competent jurisdiction may determine to 
be responsible (R. 156-157) 
The objection to the Domestic Relations Commissioner's 
Recommendation was filed June 26, 1987, in which Defendant-
Appellant objected to the Recommendation of the Commissioner 
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regarding the debt due and owing to his parents. (R. 158-159) 
A hearing on Defendant-Appellant's objection was held before 
the Honorable George E. Ballif of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on the 16th day of December, 1987. The Honorable Judge 
Ballif subsequently entered his ruling on the 17th day of 
December, 1987 as follows: 
1. That the agreement of October, 1974, was not a 
mortgage in that it does not describe land to which it 
would apply, nor does it contain any provisions 
relative to rights, obligations and procedures for 
foreclosing the same and was not recorded. 
2. That the Decree of Divorce's mention of "mortgage" 
without any other reference to the specific obligation 
claimed to be a mortgage in favor of a third party, 
and not of record, would be insufficient to establish 
liability to Plaintiff to pay and discharge that debt. 
(R. 199-202) 
Defendant-Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on the 13th 
day of January, 1988. (R. 186-187) 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Prior to the marriage of the parties, Defendant, Dale Rothe, 
purchased a home at 415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah. (R. 130) At 
the time the Defendant purchased the home, he assumed an existing 
VA mortgage of $6,818.59 and entered into an agreement with his 
father in which Defendants father agreed to loan an additional 
$31,484.04. The purchase of the home was consummated in October, 
1974. (R. 145-147) 
The only document which evidences the agreement between 
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Defendant and his father is a handwritten agreement which states: 
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the house 
loan of $38,302.63 minus the Veterans Administration 
loan of $6,818.59 plus the interest I will have to pay 
to the Bank of America. [The note is then signed Fon 
K. Rothe and Dale K. Rothe.] (R. 145) 
The parties were married several months later on July 25, 
1975. (R. 1) 
The Decree of Divorce was originally signed by Judge George 
E. Ballif of the Fourth Judicial District Court on the 24th day 
of October, 1980 which reads in pertinent part: 
That during the course of the marriage, the parties 
have acquired a home located at 415 East 900 North, 
Lehi, Utah. Said home is to be awarded to the 
Plaintiff for her exclusive possession. . . . (R. 14) 
. . . The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible 
for the mortgage due and owing on the home of the 
parties. . . . (R. 14) 
At the time of the original divorce, the parties had agreed 
among themselves as to the disposition of the property and based 
upon the Stipulation of the parties, Defendant agreed to allow 
Plaintiff to proceed by way of default -- Defendant having signed 
an Appearance, Consent and Waiver. (R. 5) 
For some 30 plus months after the divorce, the Defendant 
deducted money from his alimony payments to the Plaintiff for 
which Defendant paid an alleged mortgage on the home: 
Q. In paragraph 9, Mrs. [Rothe] Olsen, refers to a 
mortgage obligating you to be responsible for the 
mortgage due on the property, is that correct? 
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A. Right. 
Q. Who was that to? 
A. I was not sure who it was to. I just knew that 
there was a mortgage owing. He had that put into the 
papers. 
Q. And you paid it every month, didn't you. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how did you pay it. 
A. He paid it. 
Q. How did you get credit for the payments to satisfy 
your obligation? Did he not deduct it from alimony? 
A. Oh yes. 
(R. 214) 
At the time the parties reached a Stipulation and the Decree 
was entered, the Plaintiff was required to satisfy only 
obligations which ran with and were attached to the property. 
Q. Now when you went to execute these documents with 
your husband when the divorce came out, what did you 
understand your obligation to be as it relates to the 
mortgage? 
A. Well to finish paying off the mortgage. 
Q. What did you understand the term mortgage to mean? 
A. Just what was owing on the home. 
Q. Now there came a time as you say when you 
investigated the matter and found out that there was 
not anything recorded on the home and property and you 
talked to Mr. Harding about that. 
A. Right. 
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Q. Now is it your position that because there is no 
mortgage on the property, you are not obligated to pay 
any money. 
A. Well if there is no mortgage, yes. 
(R. 246-247) 
Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
Defendant on August 27, 1981, quit claimed his entire interest in 
the home and real property to the Plaintiff. (R. 225) 
Plaintiff did not know who the payments were being made to 
other than the fact that the Defendant was withholding the money 
to pay an asserted mortgage on the home. (R. 241) 
For the entire time in which Defendant was deducting 
payments from alimony, Plaintiff received no accounting 
identifying to whom the payments were being made or if payments 
were even being made by the Defendant. (R. 243) 
It was not until Plaintiff attempted to take out a second 
mortgage on the home and in the process of doing so became aware 
of the fact that there was not a mortgage on the home and upon 
advice of counsel discontinued the allowance of the money to be 
deducted from Defendant's alimony payment to Plaintiff. (R. 242) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant Dale Rothe lacks standing to assert the 
jurisdiction of the Court to enter an Order asserting the rights 
of third parties. Nor is the issue of whether Plaintiff is 
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obligated to pay Defendant's parents ripe for adjudication by 
this Court. In August of 1981, the Defendant quit claimed all 
right, title and interest he had in the subject property to the 
Plaintiff. And openly admitted at trial: 
Q. And so you don't claim any interest in that house 
at all? 
A. No. 
(R. 230) 
Consequently, Defendant has no interest in the subject 
property and further there is no indication anywhere in the 
record that a judgment has been obtained against the Defendant. 
In fact, in over two years of non-payment to his parents, 
Defendant testified at trial when asked if his parents had come 
against him, merely stated that there was not a good feeling and 
then later, in his testimony, admitted that they had not done 
anything to enforce the obligation. (R. 229, 230) Therefore, 
any obligation arising out of the subject property or an interest 
therein has no application as it relates to the Defendant. He 
has no standing to exert the rights of his parents nor have 
proceedings or judgment been initiated against the Defendant 
which would render the issue ripe for adjudication by this Court. 
The Defendants admit in their brief that the handwritten 
note between the Defendant and his father fails to constitute a 
legal mortgage which was further reiterated in the ruling by the 
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Honorable George E. Ballif. 
The Court correctly found that the note "does not describe 
land to which it would apply, nor does it contain any provisions 
relative to the rights, obligations and procedures for 
foreclosing the same." (R. 183, 184) The note was also not 
recorded as required by 57-1-6 Utah Code Annotated. In addition 
to failing the requirements necessary for legal mortgage, the 
note also fails as an equitable mortgage. There is no indication 
in the record that the Defendant and his parents had the clear 
intent to create a security interest in the property nor that the 
property to which it would apply was set out and described with 
particularity sufficient to establish a basis for equitable 
mortgage. 
Further, it is clear from the transcript that the intent of 
the parties was that the Plaintiff would assume only those 
obligations which ran with or were otherwise attached to the home 
and property. The focal issue before this Court was best 
capsulized by Judge Ballif: 
I think her testimony was, the way it came down to me, 
was that she agreed to pay whatever was against the 
house and she thought a mortgage was against the 
house. Now, we've got a very clear legal question 
there. Does it meet what would make that apply to the 
house? (R. 256) 
As one applies the most basic principles of contract law to 
the facts of this case, it is evident that Plaintiff is not 
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obligated to pay additional monies to Defendant's parents. The 
stipulation entered into between the parties constitutes a 
contract in which the parties are entitled to rely. One of the 
basic tenants of contract law is that the Court will not alter 
the clear and unambiguous terms of a contract in the absence of 
fraud or duress. There is no ambiguity in the wording of the 
agreement of the parties when they state that Plaintiff is to 
assume "the mortgage on the home." Consequently, if there is no 
mortgage on the home, Plaintiff should not be obligated therefor. 
Also, the fact that Defendant withheld money from the alimony 
payments in which his parents were supposedly repaid on the loan 
does not constitute performance such that a separate or 
alternative agreement is established. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DALE ROTHE LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIS PARENTS AND 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE ANY CLAIMS AGAINST THE 
PROPERTY PROSECUTED BY THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 
In order for a party to prosecute a cause of action, it is 
necessary for the party to have a real stake in the outcome and a 
legally protectable and tangible interest to be adjudicated: 
In order to support an action, the interest of a party 
Plaintiff must be a present, substantial interest, as 
distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, 
contingent interest. A party must show that he has a 
justiciable interest in the subject matter of the 
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litigation to maintain an action thereon. Standing is 
a concept utilized to determine if a party is 
sufficiently affected so as to insure that a 
justiciable controversy is presented to the Court. 
The requirement of standing is satisfied if it can be 
said that the Plaintiff has a legally protectable and 
tangible interest at stake in the litigation. A party 
lacks standing to invoke jurisdiction of the Court 
unless he or she has, in an individual or 
representative capacity, some real interest in the 
subject matter of the action. Standing is that aspect 
of justiciability focusing on a party seeking a forum 
rather than on the issues he or she wants adjudicated. 
The crucial inquiry in this determination is whether 
the Plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her 
invocation of the Courtfs jurisdiction and to justify 
exercise of the Court's remedial power on his or her 
behalf. (Emphasis added) 
[59 Am Jur 2d Parties Sec. 31.] 
Defendant, in seeking the Court's Order modifying the Decree 
of Divorce, attempts to assert the rights of his parents to 
recover under the agreement entered into between the Defendant 
and his father. The Defendant Dale Rothe, however, lacks the 
necessary interest in the outcome as well as lacks the legally 
protected right to assert any claims his father may have in the 
subject property. The Defendant testified at the time of trial 
that he had quit claimed any and all interest he had to the 
Plaintiff in the subject property. Consequently, the only 
interest Defendant has in modifying the Decree of Divorce is to 
require Plaintiff to make payments to Defendant's parents for 
which Defendant will receive no benefit other than to possibly 
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relieve him of an obligation which his parents may, at some time 
in the future, assert against him. 
At trial when Defendant was questioned as to whether any 
action had been initiated by his parents to enforce the 
agreement, he stated: 
Q. When did you make the last payment to your dad? 
A. It was December, I think of '85. 
Q. There is a letter that Mr. Watson wrote in May of 
f86 saying that your last payment was in December of 
f85. Do you agree with that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have not made any payments, then for two 
years? 
A. No. 
Q. Has your father done anything to report that 
obligation? 
A. Yes. They came to Mr. Watson. 
Q. Have they come against you? 
A. There is not a good feeling. 
. . . 
Q. But as of right now they have not done anything to 
enforce that obligation? 
A. No. (R. 228-230) 
Consequently, Defendant lacks standing to pursue this 
matter. 
Defendant's lack of standing given the circumstances of this 
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case is further supported by case law. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Terracor vs. Utah Board of State Lands and Forestry, 716 P.2d 796 
(Utah 1986) set out the applicable standard in determining 
whether a party has standing to sue: 
This Court has referred to three general standards for 
determining whether a litigant has standing. 
(Citations omitted.) The premise upon which these 
standards have been constructed is that issues should 
generally be litigated by those parties with the most 
direct interest in resolution of those issues, 
although in some cases, a party does not have the most 
immediate or direct interest, may have standing. The 
first general criterion is that the 'Plaintiff must be 
able to show that he has suffered some distinct and 
palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in 
the outcome of the dispute.1 (Citations omitted.) 
Second, if a Plaintiff does not have standing under 
the first criterion, he may have standing if no one 
else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case 
and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless 
that particular Plaintiff has standing to raise the 
issue. (Citations omitted.) 
Third, even though standing is not found to exist 
under the first two criteria, a Plaintiff may none 
the less have standing if the issues are unique and of 
such great public importance that they ought to be 
decided in furtherance of the public interest. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 799. 
As th€ standard set out supra is applied to the facts of 
this case, certainly the Defendant does not have standing to 
assert the rights of his parents. He has no personal stake in 
the outcome of the legal dispute in that he has previously deeded 
any interest to the property to the Plaintiff and further his 
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parents have asserted no claims against him. Defendant also 
fails the second criterion in that his parents are the ones who 
hold any right that may be asserted for repayment of the monies 
loaned and, consequently, bear the only interest in the outcome 
of the case. Finally, Defendant also fails the third criterion 
because the issues are not unique or of such great public 
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of 
public interest. 
For additional Utah citations addressing the subject, see 
York vs. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 
P.2d 679 (Utah 1986). (Plaintiff may not allege jeopardy or 
injury to others in order to confer standing upon his own 
claims.) See also Jenkins vs. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983). 
(Plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in 
the outcome of the legal dispute.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has further stated: 
As we previously have held, four requirements must be 
met in an action for declaratory judgment: (1) There 
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the interest of 
the parties must be adverse; (3) the parties seeking 
relief must have a legally protectable interest in the 
controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties 
must be ripe for judicial determination. 
Jenkins vs. Finlinson, 607 P.2d 289, 290 (Utah 1980). 
Since no proceedings have been initiated against the 
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Defendant putting him at risk or giving him any interest in the 
litigation, he has not presented a justiciable issue before the 
Court nor has he presented evidence of a right which the Court is 
obligated to protect nor has he presented the Court with a cause 
of action which is ripe for determination. Simply expressed, 
the Defendant has no liability or interest in this matter other 
than to see his parents possibly be repaid on money loaned to 
their son. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD IS VOID OF A SUFFICIENT BASIS TO WARRANT THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE 
Section 57-1-14 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended sets 
out the statutory form for the creation of a legal mortgage. A 
copy of the statutory provisions are set out under the topic 
"Determinative Constitutional and State Statutes." 
The trial court having reviewed the facts in light of the 
statutory requirements for a mortgage, correctly concluded as 
follows: 
The Court concludes that the agreement dated October 
of 1974 is not a mortgage since it does not describe 
land to which it would apply, nor does it contain any 
provisions relative to rights, obligations, and 
procedures for foreclosing the same, and was not 
recorded. (R. 183, 184.) 
The Appellant candidly admits in their brief that the note 
between Defendant and his father fails to meet the requirements 
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necessary to establish a valid legal mortgage. However, 
Appellants do assert that an equitable mortgage exists. 
Several authorities have sought to define what constitutes 
an equitable mortgage: 
There are a number of situations wherein instruments 
which are not effective as mortgages at law will be 
regarded as such and a court of equity or chancery, 
which will regard them as binding on the parties as if 
mortgages in due form have been properly executed. 
Such instruments are known as equitable mortgages. 
This rule is referable to the maxim that 'equity 
considers that as done which ought to be done, f 
although when applied to particular cases, it is 
frequently based also on other equitable grounds. The 
circumstances upon which equitable mortgages may be 
predicated are various. Broadly speaking, the 
reservation of a lien on property which is conveyed, 
an appropriation of specific property to secure the 
performance of an obligation or an attempt to create 
a mortgage although insufficient to constitute a 
mortgage at law, will in equity be given the effect 
and operation of a mortgage. 
Although an equitable mortgage may be predicated upon 
an agreement to give a mortgage, the general rule is 
that an instrument cannot operate as an equitable 
mortgage if it merely assumes that a lien has been or 
will be created; it must purport through its own terms 
and efficiency to create the lien. (Emphasis added.) 
55 Am Jur 2d Mortgages, Sec. 11 P. 200 - 201. 
Corpus Juris Secundum has defined equitable mortgage as 
follows: 
An equitable mortgage may be constituted by any 
writing from which the intention to create such lien 
may be gathered. Thus, a contract in writing to 
secure a debt specified therein, in which the parties 
expressly declare their intention to create a lien on 
real estate particularly described, is generally 
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considered an equitable mortgage, which, on non-
payment of the debt or other breach of conditions of 
the instrument, may be foreclosed in the ordinary way 
in a Court of equity. (Emphasis added.) 
59 CJS Mortgages Sec. 14, P. 44-45. 
The definition of an equitable mortgage as set out in the 
authorities cited, requires at least two things: First, the 
writing must expressly declare the intention of the parties to 
create a lien on the real estate and second, the writing must 
particularly describe the property to which the lien would 
attach. 
The only writing in which Appellant purports to establish a 
basis for the equitable mortgage is a hand written document 
entered into between Defendant and his father prior to the 
parties marriage which is not notarized and not recorded reads as 
follows: 
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the house 
loan of $38,302.63 minus the Veterans Administration 
loan of $6,818.59 plus the interest I will have to pay 
to Bank of America. [Signed Fon K. Rothe and Dale K. 
Rothe.] 
The agreement makes no express declaration or evidence of an 
intent between the parties to cieate a lien or security interest 
in the property. The agreement merely acknowledges an obligation 
to pay $150.00 per month on the note. The agreement also fails 
to establish an equitable mortgage because there is no 
description or identification that would attach the mortgage to a 
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particular piece of property. The only wording in the agreement 
which even remotely makes reference is the language which states: 
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the house 
loan of $38,302.65. . . . 
As one reads the agreement, it is clear that the intent of 
the parties was to acknowledge an obligation of paying $150.00 a 
month on a loan between Defendant and his father. Nothing in the 
agreement evidences an intention to lien the property. 
Powell on The Law of Real Property accurately sets out the 
underlying purpose for equitable mortgages: 
In cases in which the parties intended to create a 
mortgage but some defect in the execution of the 
mortgage instrument would make the mortgage legally 
unenforceable, courts are willing to recognize the 
transaction as an equitable mortgage. Thus if the 
parties fail to name a trustee in a deed of trust by 
mistake, or if a mortgage covering reality owned by 
husband and wife was signed only by the wife, the 
Court will sustain the defective instrument as an 
equitable mortgage. 
Many of the situations treated as effective to create 
equitable mortgages involve a genuine and discoverable 
intent of the parties to create a security interest, 
but fail to resort to any of the commonly recognized 
forms of mortgage. 
Powell The Law of Real Property, Sec. 46. 
All of the authorities which set out and define the 
requirements of equitable mortgage require a clear demonstration 
by the parties of their intent to create a security interest. 
Typically, those situations in which the Courts will exercise 
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their equitable powers are in the situation where an attempt is 
made to create a mortgage but due to some technicality, the 
parties have failed to create a legal mortgage. 
On several occasions, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed 
the issue of equitable mortgage; however, the cases cited by the 
Appellant and all of the cases in which Respondent has been able 
to research have dealt with the situation in which a deed to 
property has been transferred to a party in exchange for money. 
The issue of equitable mortgage arises under those circumstances 
when one of the parties claim that the transfer of the deed in 
exchange for money was in fact a mortgage as opposed to an actual 
sale of the property. In other words, where the property is 
intended to give security for the monies received under those 
circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that a party must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the intent of the party was 
to create a security interest: 
The burden of proof is on the party claiming a 
mortgage, here the Browns, to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the conveyance was intended 
as a mortgage. . . . 
The standard of appellate review of findings in equity 
cases, even where the level of proof in the trial 
court is clear and convincing evidence is the clearly 
preponderates standard. 
Brown vs. Loveland, 678 2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984). For other Utah 
citations involving equitable mortgages as it relates to deeds, 
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see Baker vs. Taggart, 628 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1981). Hansen vs. 
Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976). Jacobsen vs. Jacobsen, 557 
P.2d 156 (Utah 1976). Gibbons vs. Gibbons, 103 Utah 266, 135 
P.2d 105 (Utah 1943). Corey vs. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 
940 (Utah 1933). The definition of equitable mortgage as cited 
supra, provide that instruments aside from deeds can also give 
rise to equitable mortgages and Appellant cites three cases in 
support of the proposition. As one applies the standard set out 
requiring a clear intent of the parties to be evidenced as well 
as a description of the particular property as a predicate to the 
exercise of a court's equitable powers necessarily relies upon 
the facts of each and every case. Coast Bank vs. Minderhout, 38 
Cal. Rptr. 505 392 P.2d 265 (1964) cited by Defendant included an 
instrument entered into between the parties which stated as 
follows: 
Agreement Not to Encumber or Transfer Property. 
In consideration of any loan or advance made by Bank 
of Belmont Shore (hereinafter referred to as 'bank') 
to the undersigned, either jointly or severally, the 
undersigned (hereinafter referred to as 'borrower' 
whether one or more), jointly and severally promise 
and agree that until all such loans and advances and 
all other indebtedness or liabilities to the bank 
shall have been paid in full, or until 21 years 
following the death of the last survivor of the 
undersigned, whichever shall first occur, they will 
pay all taxes, assessments and charges of every kind, 
imposed or levied, or which may be imposed or levied 
upon the hereinafter described real property prior to 
the time when any of such taxes, assessments or 
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charges shall become delinquent and will not, without 
the consent in writing of bank, first had and 
obtained, create or permit any lien or other 
encumbrances (other than those presently existing 
and/or securing the payment of loans and advances made 
to them by bank) to exist on said real property, and 
will not transfer, sell, hypothecate, assign or in any 
manner would ever dispose of said real property, or 
any interest therein or any portion thereof, which 
real property is situated in San Louis, Obispo County, 
California [wherein a legal description of the 
property was given] [description omitted]. 
It is further agreed and understood that a default be 
made in the performance of any of the terms thereof, 
or of any instrument executed by borrower in 
connection herewith, or in the payment of any 
indebtedness or liabilities now or hereafter owing to 
bank, bank may, at its election, in addition to all 
other remedies and rights which it may have by law, 
declare the entire remaining unpaid principle and 
interest of any obligations or indebtedness then 
remaining unpaid to the bank due and payable 
forthwith. 
It is further agreed and understood that the bank may, 
in its discretion, and is hereby authorized by 
borrower, to cause this instrument to be recorded at 
such time and in such places as the bank may, in its 
discretion, elect. (Emphasis added.) 
Coast Bank Footnote 2 at 266. 
The instrument cited in which the Court determined 
constituted an equitable mortgage was properly recorded. The 
Court went on to set out the standard as to the elements 
necessary for equitable mortgage as follows: 
Every express executory agreement in writing, whereby 
the contracting party sufficiently indicate an 
intention to make some particular property, real or 
personal or fund therein described or identified, a 
security for a debt or other obligation *** creates an 
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equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which 
is enforceable against the property in the hands not 
only of the original contractor but of his *** 
purchasers or encumbrancers with notice. (Citations 
omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 
Coast Bank at 266. 
The second case cited by Appellants where the Court found 
an equitable mortgage was based upon the transfer of a Warranty 
Deed and an agreement of the parties. The Court determined with 
regard to the agreement: 
The balance of the parties' agreement was never 
reduced to writing, but both parties, while differing 
over some of its terms, recognize its existence. 
Benton vs. Benton, 526 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Kansas 1974) 
The opinion of the Court does not set out what the terms of 
the agreement encompassed other than to say that both parties 
recognized its existence. 
The third authority cited by Appellant not involving the 
transfer of a deed was Hill vs. Hill, 185 Kansas 389, 345 P. 2d 
1015 (1959). The Kansas Court in finding an equitable mortgage 
relied upon an instrument entered into between the parties which 
provided as follows: 
$2,500.00 February 20 1952 
On or before Feb. 20-1957 or on demand after date I 
promise to pay to the order of W.E. Hill or his Estate 
Twenty Five Hundred Dollars No Dollars Payable 
At Emporia State Bank - with interest at 5% per annum 
- Value Received. No Due 
Feb. 20-1957 W.W. Hill 
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R. 4. Emporia Kans. 
On the reverse side of the note appeared the 
following: 
This note is given in payment for a loan of 
$2,5000.00 in cash to make first payment of Arthur 
Glaze and Marjorie Glaze property - bought by W.W. 
Hill - Lot 21 - in Copely Addition to City of 
Emporia - House No. 115 S. Constitution St-
Emporia, Kans. It is hereby agreed that the Holder 
of this note shall have $2,500.00 interest in 
above described Property - besides his Legal 
interest as heir to Estate of W.W. Hill. 
I hereby agree to this agreement - 2-20-1952 
W.W. Hill 
Paid $750.00 Oct. 15, 1952 from acct. at Columbia 
Bid & Loan Co. 
Wm. E. Hill (Emphasis added) 
As evidenced LJ the writings associated with the cases cited 
by Defendant/Appellant, the writings upon which the Court relies 
all specifically demonstrate an intent to create a security 
interest and specifically identified the property to which the 
security interest would attach. 
The burden of proof is upon the Defendant who is asserting 
that an equitable mortgage exists to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the Defendant and his father intended to create a 
mortgage on the property. As one reviews the record in light of 
the burden of proof upon the Defendant, it is quite clear 
Defendant and his father did not even contemplate creating a 
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mortgage. Particularly, in light of the testimony of the 
Defendant when he was asked at trial regarding the subject of 
mortgages, and testified as to his understanding of what a 
mortgage entails, it was clear that he did not understand the 
nature of a security interest but merely borrowed money from his 
father which was evidenced by a note: 
Q. Had you ever bought or sold real property before 
this house? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know what a mortgage means? 
A. Well a mortgage to me means the same thing -- I 
mean, somebody owes some money. I mean, you buy an 
outfit, a house, and you owe the money to them until 
that money is paid up, you know. I mean, that's a 
mortgage. (R. 230) 
In light of the testimony of the Defendant, he did not 
understand the nature of a mortgage and, in fact, even admits in 
his brief: 
Defendant/Appellant indicated he did not understand 
the legal significance of Utah Statute regarding 
mortgages. . . . 
Defendant/Appellant Brief, page 31. 
In light of the testimony of the Defendant and the burden of 
proof which is upon him to show a clear intent to create a 
mortgage and to describe with particularity the property to which 
it would apply as a prerequisite to establish a basis for 
equitable mortgage, the Defendant has failed to meet his burden 
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of proof. 
POINT III 
THE PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THE CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS WORDING OF THEIR AGREEMENT AND THE 
COURT WILL NOT REWRITE THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The Complaint filed by the Plaintiff for a Decree of Divorce 
specifically sets out the agreement of the parties. The 
Defendant, by signing the Appearance, Consent and Waiver agreed 
and stipulated to the terms set out in Plaintiff's claim for 
relief. The Stipulation entered into between the parties 
constitutes a contract for which contract principles are 
applicable. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Where questions arise in the interpretation of an 
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the 
document itself. It should be looked at in its 
entirety and in accordance with this purpose. All of 
its parts should be given effect insofar as that is 
possible. (Citations omitted.) 
Big Cottonwood Tanner D. vs. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 
(Utah App. 1987). 
The portion of the stipulation or contract pertinent to this 
cause of action states: 
The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible for the 
mortgage due and owing upon the home of the parties. . 
. (R. 3) 
When the standard is applied to the terms of the 
Stipulation, it is clear from the document and the wording that 
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the only obligation is for the mortgage due and owing on the 
home. The word mortgage is a term of art which has specific 
meaning and the parties are bound by the wording and the term of 
art used. 
The definition of a mortgage is distinctively set out in 
Black's Dictionary as follows: 
A mortgage is an interest in land created by a written 
instrument providing security for the performance of a 
duty or the payment of a debt. 
The issue of whether a mortgage existed on the property at 
the time of the Decree of Divorce has been previously addressed 
in the discussion on whether the agreement between Defendant and 
his father constituted a legal or equitable mortgage. 
Consequently, since no mortgage existed at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce, Plaintiff is not obligated to make the payments to 
Defendant's parents. The Court, on numerous occasions, has 
stated that the Court will not make a better contract for the 
parties then they have made for themselves. See Rio Aglom Corp. 
vs. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980); Provo City Corp. vs. 
Nielson Scott Company, Inc., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANT INAPPROPRIATELY ASSERTS THAT PLAINTIFF HAD 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF WHICH MORTGAGES WERE OWING 
ON THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF THE DECREE AND 
THE THIRTY SOME ODD PAYMENTS MADE AFTER THE DECREE 
TO DEFENDANT'S PARENTS CONSTITUTES PARTIAL PERFORMANCE. 
At the time the home was originally purchased, the Defendant 
assumed an existing VA mortgage of 6,818.59 and borrowed 
$31,484.04 from his father. At the time the home was purchased 
and the money borrowed as well as the assumption of the existing 
VA mortgage, Plaintiff was not privy to any of those transactions 
and, in fact, the parties were not even married until several 
months after the fact. Consequently, whatever payments were made 
during the marriage on outstanding obligations was information 
supplied by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 
Defendant asserts in their brief that constructive notice is 
imparted to the Plaintiff for those items of record relating to 
the property and further asserts, therefore, Plaintiff had 
constructive notice at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered 
that the VA loan had been extinguished. In so asserting, 
however, the Defendant stops one fatal step short of what 
constructive notice would have been imparted to the Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff would have been on constructive notice first that the 
VA loan had been extinguished but also would have been put on 
notice that there was no existing mortgages at all on the 
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property since the agreement between Defendant and his father had 
not been recorded but was merely an acknowledgement of a personal 
obligation between the Defendant and his father. Therefore, when 
the parties entered into the Stipulation in which Plaintiff would 
take the home subject to any mortgages would further support 
Plaintiff's position that she is not obligated to pay Defendant's 
parents. 
Defendant also asserts in their brief that the fact that 38 
payments were made to Defendant's parents subsequent to the 
Decree of Divorce acknowledges Plaintiff assent to assume the 
note to Defendant's parents. This assertion is not persuasive. 
The Plaintiff had no knowledge of who the payments were made to 
and in fact it was the Defendant who took it upon himself to make 
the payments and then deducted the money from Plaintiff's 
alimony. Plaintiff testified at trial: 
Q. In paragraph 9 Mrs. Olsen refers to a mortgage 
obligating you to be responsible for the mortgage due 
on the property, is that correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. Who was that to? 
A. I was not sure who it was to I just knew that 
there was a mortgage owing. He had that put into the 
papers. 
Q. And you paid it every month didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And how did you pay it? 
A. He paid it. 
Q. How did you get credit for the payments to 
satisfy your obligation? Did he not deduct it from 
alimony? 
A. Oh yes. 
Q. And he did that for how many months? 
A. I think he said 30. I wasn't for sure how many. 
Q. You said 38. 
A. What. 
Q. Do you remember the number 38 month? 
A. No. I thought somebody said 30 months. I thought 
Dale said I would pay him for 30 months. 
Q. Do you have quarrel with that figure. 
A. No. 
Q. And for 30 or some odd months the money was 
deducted from your alimony checks, was it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who did you think it was going to? 
A. I did not know. He was just taking it out. . . . 
(R. 240, 241) 
Not only did Plaintiff not make the payments directly but 
also she was unaware of who the payments were made to. The money 
was merely deducted from the alimony payments otherwise owing to 
her. The fact that Defendant withheld the monies out of her 
alimony payment does not rise to the level of establishing a 
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course of conduct which would evidence an agreement or contract 
between the parties obligating the Plaintiff to assume the 
monthly payments. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN REFUSING TO FIND A 
MUTUAL MISTAKE. 
Defendant/Appellant attempts to take the clear language of 
the Divorce Decree, which states: 
The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible for the 
mortgage due and owing on the home of the parties, and 
the obligation due and owing on the ciutomobile. (R. 
16) 
and to create an ambiguity in the language as to have the Court 
look behind the actual language of the contract. There is no 
ambiguity in the clear wording of the Decree of Divorce. 
There is no ambiguity in the clear wording of the Decree of 
Divorce. 
Although Defendant/Appellant assert in their brief that 
Defendant was unrepresented at the time the documents were 
drafted and that it was Plaintiff's attorney who drafted the 
documents. The uncontrov^rted testimony at trial states: 
Q. Paragraph 9, Mrs. Olsen, refers to a mortgage 
obligating you to be responsible for the mortgage due 
on the property, is that correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. Who was that to? 
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A. I was not sure who it was to. I just knew that 
there was a mortgage owing. He had that put into the 
papers. (Emphasis added) (R. 240) 
Although Plaintiff's attorney was the one who drafted the 
documents, the provisions regarding the mortgage were put into 
the Decree of Divorce at the request of the Defendant. 
Consequently, Defendant cannot now assert that he does not agree 
with the language used or the provisions in the contract when 
they were put into the documents at his request and further, 
after signing a consent and waiver, agreeing that he understood 
the provision and was willing to abide by it. 
There is an almost unending list of case law standing for 
the proposition that where a contract is plain and unambiguous, 
parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms and that in 
order for parol evidence to be admitted, the Court must first 
determine that an ambiguity exists. See Hartman vs. Potter, 596 
P.2d 653 (Utah 1979); Williams vs. First Colony Life Insurance 
Company, 593 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979); Jaye Smith Construction 
Company vs. Board of Education Granite School District, 560 P.2d 
320 (Utah 1977); Union Bank vs. Swensen, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 
1985); Faulkner vs. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, Appeal After 
Remand 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant considers at length, in his brief, the intent and 
understanding of the Plaintiff; however, Plaintiff's intent and 
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understanding has no bearing on the question of whether a legal 
or equitable mortgage exists because the existence of a mortgage 
depends on the agreement and intent of the Defendant and 
Defendant's father at the time the money was loaned. The intent 
of the Plaintiff and any parol evidence relating thereto is not 
even admissible unless the Court first determines that the 
agreement of the parties in which "the Plaintiff is to assume and 
be responsible for the mortgage due and owing on the home of the 
parties. . ." is ambiguous and necessitates the offering of 
parol evidence. 
Even assuming arguendo that the terms of the Decree or 
contract are ambiguous, it was the intention of the Plaintiff 
only to assume those obligations which were attached to and ran 
with the property itself. Defendant testified: 
Q. Will you tell the Court as best you can what you 
understood the reason why you were paying the Dale's 
parents the payments on the home. 
A. Well, I thought it was because they had a note on 
the home, well I knew there was a note, but I thought 
it was a mortgage. 
Q. So you thought the loan to the parents was, in 
fact, a mortgage on the property? 
A. Right. (R. 246) 
The trial court also determined based upon the testimony of 
the parties that it was the intent on the part of Plaintiff to 
assume only those obligations which were attached to and ran with 
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the property itself- At the trial, Judge Ballif stated: 
Well, you know, a person that doesn't practice law and 
gets into financial things and security transaction 
doesn't necessarily know how something applies against 
a home. But I think what she undertook to do, it 
looks like to me, was to pay off what was against the 
home. And so the problem is, is this note against the 
home? (R. 257) 
When one applies the intent and understanding of the 
Plaintiff as set out in her testimony and the findings of the 
Court, it is consistent with the clear and unambiguous language 
of the Decree that Plaintiff only assumed those obligations which 
were attached to and ran with the property. 
POINT VI 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS A "CLEARLY PREPONDERANTS" STANDARD. 
The Defendant/Appellant correctly sets out the standard of 
review when he states in his brief: 
In equity cases, the Appellate Court can review facts 
as well as law and may reverse the lower court's 
finding if the evidence "clearly preponderants" 
against the trial court's decision. Mcbride vs. 
Mcbride, 581 P.2d 996 (Utah 1978); Peterson vs. 
Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978); Provo City vs. 
Lambert, 574 P.2d 727 (Utah 1978); Hatch vs. Bastian, 
567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977); Richards vs. Pine Ranch, 
Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). 
Appellant's Brief, page 21. 
As the Court applies the appropriate standard of review to 
the holding of the District Court, the evidence does not clearly 
preponderate against Judge BallifTs holding. Defendant openly 
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admits that a legal mortgage did not exist and as to equitable 
mortgage, the testimony is very scant as to whether the Defendant 
and his father intended to create a security interest and 
further, there is no description of the property for which it 
would attach. Aside from the note which is part of the record, 
the only testimony even addressing the issue is that testimony 
which relates to Defendant's understanding of what a mortgage 
entails. It is clear from the testimony cited supra Defendant did 
not understand the nature of a mortgage or a security interest 
consequently, it would be impossible to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that a mortgage or a security interest was 
intended. 
In addition, the wording of the Decree of Divorce is clear 
and unambiguous as to the agreement of the parties thus parol 
evidence is inadmissible and based upon the facts and the record, 
Defendant has failed to show that the evidence "clearly 
preponderants" against such a finding. 
Most importantly, however, is the issue of standing and 
ripeness. The issues of equitable and legal mortgage need not 
even be addressed because Defendant/Appellant is not the real 
party in interest and lacks standing to assert the rights, if 
any, of his parents. 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to 
affirm the decision of the trial court and the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner in ruling that Plaintiff should not be burdened with 
the obligation of repaying Defendant's parents. 
DATED this 2^ day of November, 1988. 
*ICHARD B. JOfir R HNSfl 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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